



1. Training Captain Peoria Fire Medical

- 2. 20+ years of service
- 3. Paramedic 2005
- 4. Hazmat Technician 2007
- 5. Union President for Local 493 Peoria Chapter



H

0







EN



Hazmat Hazards

► LA City Fire Local 112



Loudoun County Fire Rescue








RICKY PEARCE

Last alarm: Nov. 15, 1984

Engineer and HazMat Technician Ricky Pearce, part of HazMat Ladder 4, responded to a distress call involving a worker trapped in a chemical silo tank. Tragically, during the rescue attempt, the silo exploded, resulting in Ricky Pearce's death.

His death forever changed the way Phoenix Fire trains and operates to protect firefighters on Special Operations incidents.






IN REMEMBRANCE

RICKY PEARCE Last alarm: Nov. 15, 1984

Engineer and HazMat **Technician Ricky Pearce**, part of HazMat Ladder 4, responded to a distress call involving a worker trapped in a chemical silo tank. Tragically, during the rescue attempt, the silo



Phoenix Metro Automatic Aid System

Phoenix Fire Department Dispatch


29 Departments

643 pieces of apparatus

14,599 Square Miles

4.9 million People





Surprise Fire Medical Department

9 stations

12 pieces fire apparatus

169 sworn members

4/2 rescues/medic Units

144,000 residents (2020)

111 Square Miles



Peoria Fire Medical Department

9 stations

14 pieces fire apparatus

219 sworn members

6 rescues

191,000 residents (2020)

180 Square Miles



Regional Training Maricopa County


5 Regional Fire Academies (Phoenix/Mesa/Glendale/Gilbert/Chandler) Initial Fire Academy Training Fire 640 Hours 40 Hours Hazmat First Responder 40 Hours Wildland 40 EMS Refresher

EMS (EMT or Paramedic) 200 Hours (EMT) 1440 Hours (Paramedic)

East/Central/West Consortium Special Operations/Medical/Fire Services all set to standards Special Operations (Hazmat/Technical Rescue/Rescue Swimmer) 200 Hours Technician Classes

Lithium-ion Battery Thermal Runaway Incidents

Category 1 ● CPr ● ESS ● EV ● Sum of Fatalities ● Sum of Injuries









APS Transformer Fire July 4th 2004 5 transformers destroyed, 7 replaced Dropped power supply by 20%





CONCERNS OVER BATTERIES STORED BY APS



























Background of Facility

• 2 MW/2.16 MWh lithium-ion battery ESS


Placed in service 2017 (10,584 lithium nickel manganese cobalt) (LiNiMnCoO2)


- Average home in Arizona consumes 1 MWh/month (60 homes for 2-days)
- ESS owned by local electric utility (APS)
- Batteries manufactured by LG Chem
- ESS designed by the integrator (Fluence)
- ESS maintained by contractors to the integrator (Sturgeon)
- Flooding clean agent, HVAC, smoke detection
- Four firefighters (Peoria HAZMAT team) seriously injured
- Four firefighters (Surprise E304) held overnight for suspected exposure to HCN




Time frame

Battery Incident 1654 NOVAC 1230 system activates 1655 Dispatch from passer-by caller 1741 Entry Times1837, 1851, 1910 Final Entry 1958 Door Open 2000 Deflagration Incident 2003 Less than 3 minutes after opening the door









Google Earth photos





What We Used & Why

- Gas Range
 - ► CO 0 -5000 PPM

► TIC

- Drager Tubes & Chips
 - ▶ 0.2%
 - ▶ 0.5%

- Multi Rae (5 Gas)
 - ▶ PID 10.6eV 0 -1,000 PPM
 - ▶ Oxygen 0 30%
 - ► CO2 0 50,000PPM
 - ▶ VOC 0 1,000 PPM
 - ► CO x2 0 500 PPM & 0 1,500 PPM
 - ▶ LEL 0 100%
 - ► HCN 0 50PPM
 - ▶ NO2 0 20PPM















Photos courtesy of APS














Photos courtesy of APS









ADOSH Investigation

Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health

ADOSH

- Teams acted appropriately
- Companies followed current recommendations and standards
- Fire Department personnel should communicate with site owners
- Pre-incident planning should be included on all facilities
- Training should be conducted in the future between entities
- ► Note:
 - Initial reported sited potential violations of NFPA 855 which was not in use at the time of the incident

Arizona Cooperation Commission

After reviewing three (3) separate APS incidents, Lithium-ion batteries create unacceptable risk and other alternatives should be explored

Batteries have been continuously charged against their design

Inadequate electrical circuit protections to prevent heat build up or arcing

MSDS at facility showed failures were "anticipated" yet protections in place were not designed to handle a fire or runaway issues

APS verse LG Chem Reports

► APS claims

Faulty battery components

LG Chem claims

- External source failure
 - Arch or unintended heat build-up

Both agree

- Thermal runaway occurred
- Gasses accumulated
- Safety systems need to be altered
- Door being opened did contribute to deflagration happening sooner

Actions in Arizona


► APS

Decommissioned the sister facility within months of the April 19th incident

Made a concentrated effort to now outsource all storage

Industry

- Improved battery design
- Improved building layouts
- Exploring ventilation systems
- Defining suppression systems
- Improve real-time data from inside impacted areas







Fire Code in Phoenix Metro Area


Changes have been made to the fire code

Some cities have adopted the codes

Some cities have already issued exception permits

Utility companies recommend that home installers follow industry guidelines but do not enforce them

Buildings and Permits is not necessarily tracking locations and installation of in home systems.








SRP Facility

- 105 Courts 54th 51 - CAB AES
- Chandler Arizona
- ► April 18th 2022
- ► 10 MW facility
- Industrial Complex
- Sprinklers
- ► April 29th
- May 1st























► SRP 25 MW

TESLA

Peoria Az

► Tesla









Nikola Truck fires x4













TRAINING BULLET IN JULY 2022

REGIONAL OPERATIONS CONSISTENCY COMMITTEE

Why is BESS Important?

The rise in the number of residential Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) requires the need for responding companies to have a heightened understanding of the hazards involved through comprehensive initial size-ups and greater situational awareness. Always consider contacting the proper utilities, your Fire Prevention team, and the BESS manufacturing company for any fire incident with BESS on the property.

Hazards Associated With BE6S

All firf i ghters should be aware of the following hazards:

Thermal Runaway: Thermal runaway in a single cell can result in an uncontrolled chain reaction that heats up neighboring cells. As this process continues, it can result in a battery fire or explosion.

Stranded Energy: As with most electrical equipment there is a shock hazard present, but what is unique about BESS is that often, even after being disconnected and/or involved in a fire, there is still stored energy within the BESS that can result in shock or reignition.



Toxic & Flammable Gases: Most batteries create toxic and flammable gases when they undergo thermal runaway which can easily lead to the creation of an explosive atmosphere inside of the BESS room (garage).

Deep Seated Fires: BESS are comprised of batteries housed in protective metal/plastic casings which will block water from accessing the seat of the fire. This means it will take large amounts of water to effectively dissipate the heat generated by BESS fires.

Operational Considerations For Fires Involving Residential BESS

- Pre-Plan residences in your 1st due with Solar & BESS.
- Utilize CAD premise alerts when responding to incidents.
- SLOW DOWN & conduct a complete size-up with 360°.
- Be aware of the explosive potential for any BESS.

ence and location of the BESS.

- Due to explosive risks, avoid staging companies in the front of garages or near BESS.
- White colored smoke from a compartment containing a BESS is a good indication of hazardous off-gassing.
- Any smoke or odors from BESS are indications of a hazard.
- If a BESS is involved in a fire, ensure foam is off and apply substantial water to the battery enclosure and exposures, from a safe distance in a defensive posture.
- Never open any doors or remove any panels to BESS units
- Shutting off the battery disconnect or residential/solar power supply does <u>NOT</u> remove energy from the battery.
- Thermal imaging cameras may not be reliable identifiers of heat signatures due to BESS construction.
- The ensure foam is off absolutely if it is a traditional foam, but F500 (not a foam but encapsulator) has been successful when the cells are exposed, refer to your specific FD guidelines.
- In most residential applications, the BESS will be located inside the garage or outside on an exterior wall. IF WE KNOW OR SUSPECT A BESS IS PRESENT, STAY AWAY FROM IT. IF IT IS IN THE GARAGE DO NOT MAKE ENTRY INTO THE GARAGE. If possible, check with the homeowner on the pres-







Deflagration and ESS

March 3, 2022 Bodnegg, Germany ESS in basement, PV on roof

Pressure wave "pushed several windows and doors open" and "lifted the entire roof structure" No injuries



Plant was almost new: Battery for photovoltaics exploded - 100,000 euros damage caused by fire in Lower Franconia Grub am Forst: Storage battery triggers explosion

Battery storage detonated: violent explosion in the hou



https://www.pvsafety.de/nachrichten/die-explosion-von-bodnegg/

BE23EV10609

73

Field Incidents with Li-ion Batteries in Residences

Montreal, Canada - July 27, 2019








Video courtesy of Mountain Video Fire Department



Background – Li-ion ESS Thermal Runaway Risk



Fire Service Training Resources



Research: Fire Safety Hazards of Lithium-lon Battery Powered e-Mobility Devices

FSRI research study of e-mobility device fire safety, in partnership with the Fire Department of the City of New York.



Research: The Impact of Batteries on Fire Dynamics

FSRI research into understanding fire and explosion hazards associated with lithium-ion batteries in residential compartments.



Presentation

Download a PDF of the complete Lithium-Ion Battery Symposium: Challenges for the Fire Service presentation deck.

Please note: video files within the presentation are not accessible.



Want to Learn More?

Download the guide: The Science of Fire and Explosion Hazards from Lithium-Ion Batteries.



Research: Fire Safety of Batteries and Electric Vehicles

FSRI research into the understanding of hazards generated by electric vehicle (EV) battery fires to enable the development of firefighting tactics for effective EV fire control.



Online Training

Learn how to identify the risks associated with lithium-ion battery products in your personal and professional life.



Steve Kerber, Ph.D. (Vice President and Executive Director, FSRI) introduces FSRI's mission, the existing hazards in today's fire environment, and the challenges lithium-ion batteries pose for the fire service.




FDNY Google Drive


Access additional resources from the Lithium-Ion Batteries: Challenges for the Fire Service symposium hosted in partnership with FDNY, FSRI, and the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) in September 2022.

Fire and Explosion Hazards

Five Factors Contribute to Hazard Development



OUR ASSUMPTION The gases produced during thermal runaway ARE FLAMMABLE and an IGNITION SOURCE IS PRESENT.




Videos and Charts authorized by UL/FSRI Kerber/Baroway

Thermal Runway



UL Oven Experiments



- Potential impact of li-ion residential ESS on incident response
- Objectives:
 - Determine whether li-ion battery gas impacts compartment fire dynamics
 - Develop size-up and tactical considerations for first responders to li-ion residential energy storage system fire incidents









Disclaimer: The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government.



FF.ORG 80


Interior view – Battery failure



Deflagration







Slow motion explosion



























Explosion Hazards from Li-ion Battery Thermal Runaways in Residential Garages





When li-ion batteries undergo thermal runway without burning, an explosion hazard begins to develop.





BE23EV106095

The timing of a battery gas explosion is unpredictable. The severity of a battery gas explosion is dependent on gas quantity.



24:01 (TR + 03:31)




25:13 (TR + 04:43)



26:22 (TR + 05:52)



29:43 (TR + 09:13)



30:50 (TR + 10:20)





A significant explosion hazard can develop before any exterior indicators (visual or measured) are shown.





Unburned battery gas ignites readily and can increase the flammability of the smoke in a ventilation-limited fire.





BE28EV/106094

Without active fire, lithium-ion battery pack thermal runaways <u>may</u> be recognizable by white/gray battery gas leaking from the structure and forming low-hanging clouds.



DOE Test #2

Test #3 in 2020 UL Series

Surprise, AZ

BE23EV/10609

With or without active fire, stratification of smoke at the ceiling and at the floor indicates the thermal runaway of liion batteries.







With an active fire, there are no reliable visual or thermal imaging indicators to confirm battery involvement from the exterior of the structure.

Before TR	CCUULT I I S. 11 CCUULT I I S. 11 CCUULT I I S. 11	174F	Ct Auto-Collisies Bio- Brocholings Sta	max 246 ^{°F} ■	211
During TR		1200 F 1200 1000 1000 1000 1000	ST Carbon Control of the state	max 295 [™] ■	250

BE28EV/106095

Portable gas meters are not effective for determining whether a garage fire involves lithium-ion batteries.

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4
	(t=vent)	(t=deflagration)	(t=vent)	(t=vent)
Gas Species	[ppm]	[ppm]	[ppm]	[ppm]
СО	0 (140)	60 (170)	20 (30)	0 (225)
LEL	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0) ^[1]
HCN	1.5 (9)	2 (5)	2 (2)	1 (10.5)
VOC	0 (5)	2 (24)	3 (5)	0 (8)



Source: UL Solutions

During size-up, additional indicators for residential energy storage system installation should be considered beyond smoke appearance.

- Response area Know your running district
- Presence of Photovoltaic System
- Meter altering Additional connections
- Labeling
- Presence of EV
- Sounds and Smells
- Dispatch, interviews





Fire fighters are at greatest risks for explosion hazards in the driveway and at doors, windows and other vent points. Do not park fire apparatus or stage crews in line of the front of the garage door.







Do not approach or enter to take portable gas meter measurements if there is a suspected case of batteries in thermal runaway and there are no indicators of an active fire.





Because conditions can change rapidly, full structural PPE with SCBA should be donned before performing size-up. PPE should also be worn in the vicinity of heat impacted batteries until removed from the scene.





Because conditions can change rapidly, hose lines should be pre-deployed, charged, and ready for operations before ventilation or entry when li-ion thermal runaways are suspected





Hose lines should remain available to manage reignition/thermal runaway of heat impacted batteries until removed from the scene.





Conclusions

- Systems that limit the oxygen to the system will preserve the batteries and reduce runaway but increase the chance of explosion.
- In all tests the systems created either a flash or explosion once the proper flammable mix was met
- Ventilation systems may help with eliminating explosions hazard but will still create a flash risk
- Thermal runaway can happen and be maintained at lower levels even in limited oxygen environments
- Don't trust the SMEs, they may know even less than you do